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Abstract. Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social
choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects
itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the
choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alter-
natives. Koray [3] shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function
is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we con-
fine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine
whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral,
unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be
self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic,
and thus again dictatorial.
1 Introduction
Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules
introduced by Koray [3]. Here we consider a society that will make a collec-
tive choice from a set of alternatives, which can be regarded as the ordinary
choice level. Now, imagine that our society is also to choose the choice rule
that will be used in making this ordinary-level choice. If we think of the pro-
cess of choosing the choice rule as the ‘‘constitutional’’ level, a natural ques-
tion that arises concerns the consistency between the ordinary and constitu-
tional levels of choice. More specifically, the society’s preference profile on the
underlying set of alternatives induces a preference profile on any set of social
choice functions, SCFs, in a natural fashion, where the SCFs are ranked
according to the alternatives they choose at the ordinary level. The question
now is whether an SCF which the society decides to use in choosing an alter-
native at the ordinary level also selects itself at the constitutional level from
among other such functions that are available to our society. In the case where
a particular SCF selects some other SCF rather than itself at the induced
preference profile on the set of available SCFs, it is not unnatural to ascribe
this phenomenon to a certain lack of consistency on the part of this SCF, for it
is exactly according to its own rationale that it rejects itself.
Roughly speaking, we call an SCF self-selective at a particular preference
profile if it selects itself from among any finite number of such rival functions
at the induced profile. Moreover, an SCF is said to be universally self-selective
if it is self-selective at each preference profile. The question now is which SCFs
are universally self-selective. It is easy to see that dictatorial SCFs are univer-
sally self-selective. In fact, Koray [3] shows that a neutral and unanimous SCF
is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Can one escape this
negative result by relaxing some conditions possibly necessitating it? There are
two standard methods used in social choice theory to achieve similar aims.
One is the restriction of the domain of the social choice rules considered, for
example, to single-peaked preference profiles. Another is allowing the social
choice rules, SCRs, under consideration to be set-valued rather than confining
oneself to SCFs only. Both of these approaches turn out to work in the present
context.
Before reporting the results that these two approaches lead, we wish to note
that there is a third approach peculiar to the present context. One can restrict
the set of SCFs against which self-selectivity is to be tested. Naturally, the
smaller the set of test SCFs, the easier will it be for any SCF to pass the con-
sistency test. It is quite possible, however, that the above kind of ‘‘monoto-
nicity’’ is not strict in the sense that an SCF that fails the test of self-selectivity
may continue to be non-self-selective even though the set of test SCFs is
shrunk to a much smaller set than the initial one. In the present paper, we
will confine ourselves to tops-only SCFs. Roughly speaking, an SCF is called
‘‘tops-only’’, if whenever each individual’s best alternative is the same in any
two given preference profiles, then outcomes of the SCF under these two pref-
erence profiles will also be the same. But this restriction does not change the
results regarding self-selectivity: the only SCFs that are self-selective on this
domain are dictatorial SCFs. The reason why we consider tops-only SCFs
as our test functions is twofold. One is, of course, that most of the widely
used electoral systems are actually tops-only. Secondly, tops-onliness con-
joined with unanimity seems to single out the genuine rival SCFs to test self-
selectivity. As we will see, self-selective, unanimous, neutral, tops-only func-
tions turn out to choose from among top alternatives only. It is intuitively
clear that the presence of SCFs that do not choose from among top alter-
natives as test functions is bound to go unnoticed regarding self-selectivity.
Turning back to the first two approaches to escape the negative dictator-
iality result without giving up self-selectivity, both approaches seem to have
lead to more ‘‘promising’’ results than restriction of test SCFs so far. Unel [6]
provides a whole class of non dictatorial self-selective SCFs by restricting the
domain to the single-peaked ones. Allowing the SCRs being multivalued, on
the other hand, leads to a rediscovery of the Condorcet rule. Koray [2] char-
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acterizes the Condorcet rule as the maximal neutral top-majoritarian and uni-
versally self-selective SCR.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we for-
malize the concept of self-selectivity and introduce other basic notions used
in the paper. Section 3 reports a sequence of results about neutral unanimous
tops-only self-selective SCFs, leading to a characterization of such voting
rules as just dictatorialities. Section 4 concludes the paper with some closing
remarks.
2 Basic notions
We let N stand for a finite nonempty society and keep it fixed throughout
the paper. We will allow, however, the alternative set to change so long as it
has a positive finite cardinality. As we will confine ourselves to neutral social
choice functions here, only the size of the alternative set will matter. Thus, we
write Im ¼ f1; . . . ;mg for each m A N to represent an m-element set of alter-
natives, where N denotes the set of all positive integers as usual. Letting LðImÞ




a social choice function (SCF) if and only if, for all m A N and R A LðImÞN ,
one has F ðRÞ A Im. Note that our definition of an SCF allows us to consider
its action on preference profiles for alternative sets of di¤erent sizes. This is,
of course, an appropriate approach in the context of voting rules, where the set
of candidates is mostly unknown when the voting rule is decided upon. It is
needed here for our analysis since we will be interested in what an SCF will
choose from di¤erent sets of available SCFs even if the basic alternative set is
kept fixed.
Given any m A N, R A LðImÞN and a permutation s on Im, we define the
permuted linear order profile Rs on Im as follows: For any i A N, k; l A Im, we
say that kRsi l if and only if sðkÞRisðlÞ. Now an SCF F is called neutral if and
only if, for each m A N and every permutation s on Im, one has
sðFðRsÞÞ ¼ F ðRÞ:
We will denote the class of all neutral SCFs by N.
We now wish to extend the domain of an SCF so as to cover linear order
profiles on any nonempty finite set. The natural way of doing this seems to be
by renaming the elements of the given set using an initial segment of natural
numbers. As we wish the alternative chosen by our SCF to be independent of
how we do this renaming, we will confine ourselves to neutral SCFs. Now let
1 Formally, a linear order R on a set S is a binary relation, which is reflexive (xRx,
Ex A S), transitive (if xRy and yRz, then xRz, Ex; y; z A S), and total (for any x; y A S
with x0 y: xRy or yRx, but not both.).
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F A N, and take any finite set A with jAj ¼ m A N, where jAj stands for the
cardinality of A. Let m : Im ! A be a bijection. Denoting LðAÞ for the set
of all linear orders on A, take any linear order profile L A LðAÞN . Now L
induces a linear order profile Lm on Im in a natural way as follows: For any
i A N and any k; l A Im, we say that kL
m
i l if and only if mðkÞLimðlÞ. Finally,
we simply define FðLÞ ¼ mðFðLmÞÞ. Note that FðLÞ A A and if m : Im ! A and
m 0 : Im ! A are two bijections, then s ¼ m1  m 0 is a permutation on Im. Set
R ¼ Lm, then Rs ¼ Lm 0 and by the definition of neutrality sðFðRsÞÞ ¼ F ðRÞ
which implies that mðFðLmÞÞ ¼ m 0ðF ðLm 0 ÞÞ. That is, F ðLÞ does not depend
upon which bijection m : Im ! A is employed.
Let the underlying set of alternatives be represented by Im, our society N
be endowed with a preference profile R A LðImÞN , and a nonempty set A
of SCFs be available to this society to employ in making its choice from Im.
The agents in this society are naturally expected to rank the SCFs in A in
accordance with what these choose from Im at R. This induces a preference
profile on A. Formally, we define these induced relations RAi (i A N) on A
as follows: For any i A N and F ;G A A, we say that FRAi G if and only if
F ðRÞRiGðRÞ. Note that, although each agent preference ordering is linear
order, RA is a complete preorder2 profile on A, and it will be called the
preference profile on A induced by R.
Now imagine that our society endowed with the preference profile R on Im
is also to choose an SCF from among those in A to employ in making its
choice from A. But then it also needs a choice rule to choose this SCF from
A on which it already has an induced preference profile RA. Now whatever
F A A is chosen to make the choice from Im, it is only natural to ask whether
this F would choose itself if it were also employed in making the choice from
A. If the induced profile RA is linear order profile, what we are asking here is
nothing but whether FðRAÞ ¼ F . Since RA need not be a linear order profile
in general, however, we relax our consistency test by asking whether there is a
linear order profile L on A compatible with RA such that F ðLÞ ¼ F .
Formally, given a complete preorder r on a finite nonempty set A, we say
that a linear order l on A is compatible with r if and only if, for all x; y A A,
xly implies xry. For each m A N, R A LðImÞN and every nonempty finite sub-
set A of N, we set
LðA;RÞ ¼ fL A LðAÞN jLi is compatible with RAi ; for each i A Ng;
and we refer to LðA;RÞ as the set of all linear order profiles on A induced
by R.
This construction now turns our consistency test (in the sense of a certain
self-selectivity) for SCFs into a well-posed question. Thus, we are ready to for-
mally introduce the central notion of this paper.
Given F A N, m A N, R A LðImÞN and a finite subset A of N with F A A,
2 Formally, a complete preorder R on a set S is a binary relation, which is reflexive
(xRx, Ex A S), transitive (if xRy and yRz, then xRz, Ex; y; z A S), and complete (for
any x; y A S xRy or yRx, or both.).
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we say that F is self-selective at R relative to A if and only if there exists some
L A LðA;RÞ with F ðLÞ ¼ F . Given a nonempty subclass T of N, we say
that F A T is T-self-selective at R if and only if F is self-selective at R relative
to any subset A of T with F A A. Moreover, F is said to be T-self-selective
if and only if F is T-self-selective at each R A 6
m AN LðImÞ
N : We refer to T-
self-selectivity as universal self-selectivity when T ¼N. Given a nonempty
finite set A, a A A and a linear order l on A, we set Lða; lÞ ¼ fx A A j alxg and
refer to Lða; lÞ as the lower contour set of l at a. Moreover, we write tðlÞ ¼ a
if and only if Lða; lÞ ¼ A, and call tðlÞ the top alternative of l. An SCF F is
called unanimous if and only if, for all m A N, R A LðImÞN and a A Im, one has
ðEi A N : tðRiÞ ¼ aÞ ) FðRÞ ¼ a:
Moreover we say that j A N is a dictator for F if and only if, for all m A N
and R A LðImÞN , one has FðRÞ ¼ tðRjÞ. We refer to F as a dictatorial SCF in
case there is a dictator j A N for F.
Before proceeding further, it will be both illuminating and instructive to see
the concept of self-selectivity in an example. The following example is taken
from Koray [3] with some modifications.
Example. Consider a society N ¼ fa; b; g; dg consisting of four agents. Let F1
be the plurality function where all ties are broken in favor of a. Given any
m A N and R A LðImÞN , an outcome a A Im is said to be a Condorcet winner
at R if and only if, for all b A Imnfag, jfi A N j aRibgjb jNj=2 ¼ 2. In case the
set of Condorcet winners at R is nonempty, we define F2 to be the Condorcet
winner most preferred by a if m is odd, and the Condorcet winner most pre-
ferred by b if m is even; if there is no Condorcet winner at R at all, we set
F2ðRÞ ¼ tðRaÞ. We let F3 stand for the Borda function where ties are broken
in favor of g and the scoring vector employed on Im is the standard one,
namely ðm;m 1; . . . ; 1Þ, for each m A N. Finally, F4 will denote the dictato-
rial SCF where d is dictator, i.e. F4 ¼ tðRdÞ at each R A 6m AN LðImÞ
N . It is
clear that F1;F2;F3; and F4 are all neutral and unanimous SCFs. Note that F1
and F4 are tops-only, and F2;F3 are not. Now let us consider the following
linear order profile R on I3:
Ra Rb Rg Rd
2 1 3 1
1 3 2 2
3 2 1 3
First consider the case where the set A of available SCFs is fF1;F2;F3g.
We have F1ðRÞ ¼ 1, F2ðRÞ ¼ 2, and F3ðRÞ ¼ 1. The complete preorder RA
on A induced by R is represented in the following table with a comma sepa-








F2 F1;F3 F2 F1;F3
F1;F3 F2 F1;F3 F2
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Now consider LðA;RÞ that consists of 24 linear order profiles compatible
with the above complete preorder profile in each component. The linear order
profile L below is a member of LðA;RÞ:
La Lb Lg Ld
F2 F3 F2 F3
F3 F1 F3 F1
F1 F2 F1 F2
Since F2ðLÞ ¼ F2 and F3ðLÞ ¼ F3, we conclude that both F2 and F3 are
self-selective at R relative to A. However, not only is it true that F1ðLÞ ¼
F2 0F1, but we also have F1ð~LÞ0F1 for any ~L A LðA;RÞ since, at each
such ~L; F2 is top-ranked by two members of N including a to whose favor all
ties broken under F1.
Now consider the case where A 0 ¼ fF2;F3g. Here LðA 0;RÞ consists of








F2 F3 F2 F3
F3 F2 F3 F2
Now F2ðL 0Þ ¼ F3 0F2 and F3ðL 0Þ ¼ F2 0F3. Since LðA 0;RÞ ¼ fL 0g,
this means that neither F2 nor F3 is self-selective at R relative to A
0.
Finally, assume that our society’s available set A 00 of SCFs is fF3;F4g.
Note that F4ðRÞ ¼ 1 ¼ F3ðRÞ. Now consider two profiles L;L 0 A LðA 00;RÞ
such that at L all agents in N top rank F3, at L
0 all agents in N top rank F4.
Clearly, F3ðLÞ ¼ F3 and F4ðL 0Þ ¼ F4. Thus, both F3 and F4 are self-selective
at R relative to A 00. Actually, it is trivially true that F4 is universally self-
selective. Moreover, we have seen that none of the F1;F2;F3 is universally
self-selective. r
We know from Koray [3] that a neutral and unanimous SCF is universally
self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. The question we deal with here is to
find out what happens if we relax our consistency test by confining ourselves
to ‘‘tops-only’’ SCFs. We call an SCF F tops-only if and only if, for any
m A N, R;R 0 A LðImÞN , one has
ðEi A N : tðRiÞ ¼ tðR 0i ÞÞ ) F ðRÞ ¼ FðR 0Þ:
Denoting the class of neutral and tops-only SCFs by Y, the question posed
above can now be rephrased as characterizing Y-self-selective SCFs. The next
section deals with this problem.
3 Results
We will first find some conditions which are necessary for Y-self-selectivity of
unanimous SCFs. Note that our definition of a tops-only SCF does not guar-
antee the choice of an alternative which is top-ranked by at least one agent at
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a given linear order profile, but only requires the invariance of the chosen alter-
native so long as the list(N-tuple) of alternatives top-ranked by agents stays
the same. It turns out, however, that only top alternatives will be chosen by a
tops-only SCF if it is unanimous and Y-self-selective as well. For any m A N,
R A LðImÞN , we let TðRÞ stand for the collection of all top-ranked alterna-
tives at R, i.e. TðRÞ ¼ ftðRiÞ j i A Ng. Before stating and proving any results,
we also note the following simple fact which will be used extensively through-
out the paper: For any m A N, R A LðImÞN and a A TðRÞ, there exists some
F A Y with F ðRÞ ¼ a. In what follows, m will always stand for an arbitrary
positive integer.
Proposition 1. If F A Y is unanimous and Y-self-selective, then FðRÞ A TðRÞ
for each R A 6
m AN LðImÞ
N .
Proof. Suppose that F A Y is unanimous and Y-self-selective, but there is
some R A 6
m AN LðImÞ
N with F ðRÞ B TðRÞ. Set FðRÞ ¼ a. Now let ~R be
the linear order profile for which Lða; ~RiÞ ¼ fag and Lðx; ~RiÞnfag ¼
Lðx;RiÞnfag for each i A N and x A Anfag. In other words, ~R is simply the
linear order profile obtained from R by pushing a down to the bottom in each
agent’s preference ordering and leaving the relative positions of all the other
alternatives fixed. Since we assumed a B TðRÞ, we have that tðRiÞ ¼ tð ~RiÞ for
all i A N, implying that F ð ~RÞ ¼ a since F is tops-only.
Now choose b A Tð ~RÞ. Now there is some G A Y with Gð ~RÞ ¼ GðRÞ ¼ b.
Set A ¼ fF ;Gg. Clearly, LðA; ~RÞ ¼ f~Lg, where G~LiF for each i A N by con-
struction of ~R. Now by unanimity of F, one should have Fð~LÞ ¼ G, while
F ð~LÞ ¼ F is implied by Y-self-selectivity of F. Since clearly F 0G, this con-
tradiction implies that F ðRÞ A TðRÞ for each R A 6
m AN LðImÞ
N . r
Now remember that we call an SCF F Paretian if and only if, for all R A
6
m AN LðImÞ
N , FðRÞ is Pareto optimal with respect to R. Since an alterna-
tive top-ranked by at least one agent is clearly Pareto optimal, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. If F A Y is unanimous and Y-self-selective, then F is Paretian.
The following lemma specifies another simple necessary condition for
Y-self-selectivity of unanimous SCFs which turns out to play a crucial role in
what follows.
Lemma 1. Let F A Y be a unanimous and Y-self-selective SCF and R A LðImÞN
with FðRÞ ¼ a. If BH Im is such that a B B, then F ðRjImnBÞ B TðRÞnfag.
Proof. Suppose that BH Im, a B B, but FðRjImnBÞ ¼ b A TðRÞnfag: Now
there is some G A Y with GðRÞ ¼ b. Set A1 ¼ fF ;Gg. Since a0 b, we have
LðA1;RÞ ¼ fL1g for some L1 A LðA1ÞN . But then FðL1Þ ¼ F by Y-self-
selectivity of F. Now set R 0 ¼ RjImnB. We know by proposition 1 that
a A TðRÞ, so that a A TðR 0Þ as well since a A ImnB. Then, however, there is
some H A Y with HðR 0Þ ¼ a. Set A2 ¼ fF ;Hg. Now LðA2;R 0Þ ¼ fL2g for
some L2 A LðA2ÞN , since FðR 0Þ ¼ b0 a ¼ HðR 0Þ. But then FðL2Þ ¼ F
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again by Y-self-selectivity of F. Define s : A1 !A2 by sðF Þ ¼ H, sðGÞ ¼ F .
Since s is a bijection, by neutrality of F, F ðL2Þ ¼ sðFðLs2 ÞÞ. Note that
Ls2 ¼ L1, hence sðFðLs2 ÞÞ ¼ sðFðL1ÞÞ ¼ sðF Þ ¼ H, in contradiction with
F ðL2Þ ¼ F . Thus, the proof is complete. r
The above lemma is clearly related with some version of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. In our context, we will say that an SCF F A N satisfies
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if and only if, for any m A N,
R A LðImÞN , one has
½BH Im and FðRÞ B B ) F ðRÞ ¼ FðRjImnBÞ:
We will show below that a neutral, unanimous and Y-self-selective SCF
actually satisfies IIA which is much stronger than the condition stated in
Lemma 1. We first need a sequence of intermediate results, however. The
following proposition tells that a unanimous Y-self-selective, tops-only SCF
does not distinguish between di¤erent sizes of alternative sets, so long as the
list(N-tuple) of top-ranked alternatives are the same.
Proposition 2. Let F A Y be a unanimous and Y-self-selective SCF, and let
R; ~R A 6
m AN LðImÞ
N
. If tðRiÞ ¼ tð ~RiÞ for each i A N, then F ðRÞ ¼ Fð ~RÞ.
Proof. Suppose that tðRiÞ ¼ tð ~RiÞ for each i A N, but F ðRÞ ¼ a0 b ¼ Fð ~RÞ:
By proposition 1, a; b A TðRÞ ¼ Tð ~RÞ. But then there exist G;H A Y such that
GðRÞ ¼ b and Hð ~RÞ ¼ a. Setting A1 ¼ fF ;Gg and A2 ¼ fF ;Hg, we have
that LðA1;RÞ ¼ fL1g and LðA2; ~RÞ ¼ fL2g for some L1 A LðA1ÞN and
L2 A LðA2ÞN . By Y-self-selectivity of F, it follows that FðL1Þ ¼ F ¼ FðL2Þ.
On the other hand, defining s : A1 !A2 by sðF Þ ¼ H, sðGÞ ¼ F , it now
follows by neutrality of F that F ðL2Þ ¼ sðF ðLs2 ÞÞ ¼ sðFðL1ÞÞ ¼ sðF Þ ¼ H, in
contradiction with F ðL2Þ ¼ F . r
We now let SaðRÞ ¼ fi A N j tðRiÞ ¼ ag for each m A N, R A LðImÞN and
a A Im.
Lemma 2. Let F A Y be unanimous and Y-self-selective. Assume that jNjb 2,
and let m A N. Let R; ~R A LðImÞN be such that TðRÞ ¼ fa; bg with a0 b,
Tð ~RÞH fa; bg, SaðRÞHSað ~RÞ, and Sað ~RÞnSaðRÞ ¼ fkg for some k A N. Now
if FðRÞ ¼ a, then Fð ~RÞ ¼ a.
Proof. Assume that F ðRÞ ¼ a. First consider the case, where m b 3, and pick
c A Imnfa; bg. Now take R; R̂ A LðImÞN such that the following are satisfied
for any x A Imnfa; b; cg:
Ei A SaðRÞ : aRicRibRix;
cRkbRkaRkx;
Ei A Sbð ~RÞ : bRicRiaRix;
Ei A Nnfkg : R̂i ¼ Ri;
cR̂kaR̂kbR̂kx;
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First note that F ðRjfa;bgÞ ¼ a by lemma 1. We now wish to show
that FðRÞ ¼ a. We know that FðRÞ A TðRÞ ¼ fa; b; cg. First suppose that
F ðRÞ ¼ c. Again by lemma 1, it follows that F ðRjfa; cgÞ ¼ c. Considering
the bijection s : fa; cg ! fa; bg with sðaÞ ¼ a, sðcÞ ¼ b, neutrality of F
implies that F ðRjfa;bgÞ ¼ b0 a, a contradiction. Now consider the case, where
F ðRÞ ¼ b. Lemma 1 implies that F ðRjfa;bgÞ ¼ b. Moreover, by construction
of R, Rjfa;bg ¼ Rjfa;bg, so that F ðRjfa;bgÞ ¼ b, again a contradiction. Thus,
F ðRÞ ¼ a.
Note that tðRiÞ ¼ tðR̂iÞ for each i A N, so FðR̂Þ ¼ F ðRÞ ¼ a since F is
tops-only. But then, again by lemma 1, FðR̂jfa;bgÞ ¼ a.
Finally, suppose that Fð ~RÞ ¼ b, whence Fð ~Rjfa;bgÞ ¼ b by the same token
since Tð ~RÞH fa; bg by hypothesis. But ~Rjfa;bg ¼ R̂jfa;bg, i.e. Fð ~Rjfa;bgÞ ¼ a, a
contradiction. Hence, as F ð ~RÞHTð ~RÞ, we conclude that Fð ~RÞ ¼ a.
Now consider the case, where m ¼ 2. Then fa; bg ¼ f1; 2g. Define
R 0; ~R 0 A LðI3ÞN by letting, for all i A N, Lð3;R 0i Þ ¼ Lð3; ~R 0i Þ ¼ f3g; aR 0i b
i¤ aRib; a ~R
0
i b i¤ a
~Rib. In other words, we extend R and ~R to linear order
profiles on I3 by simply bottom ranking 3 everywhere. Now FðR 0Þ ¼ F ðRÞ by
proposition 2, so that R 0 and ~R 0 satisfy all the hypotheses for the case with
m b 3. Thus, F ð ~R 0Þ ¼ a. But now ~R 0jfa;bg ¼ ~R and, by Lemma 1, it follows
that F ð ~RÞ ¼ a. r
Now utilizing Lemma 2, below we will show that if one agent, who was
not top ranking the alternative chosen by a unanimous and Y-self-selective
SCF at some profile, changes his/her preferences so as to top rank it, while the
remaining agents stick to their original preferences, then the same outcome
continues to get chosen by the said SCF.
Proposition 3. Let F A Y be unanimous and Y-self-selective. Assume that
jNjb 2, and let R; ~R A LðImÞN for some m A N with FðRÞ ¼ a. If there exists
j A N such that tðRjÞ0 a, tð ~RjÞ ¼ a and tðRiÞ ¼ tð ~RiÞ for all i A Nnf jg, then
F ð ~RÞ ¼ a.
Proof. Suppose that there is some j A N satisfying the given condition, but
F ð ~RÞ ¼ b0 a. Now b A Tð ~RÞ by Proposition 1. Since clearly Tð ~RÞHTðRÞ,
we have b A TðRÞ. Thus, by Lemma 1, it follows that FðRjfa;bgÞ ¼ a.
We define a linear order profile R 0 on fa; bg through letting R 0i ¼ Rijfa;bg
for all i A Nnf jg and aR 0j b. Now either tðRijfa;bgÞ ¼ tðR 0i Þ for all i A N, so
that F ðR 0Þ ¼ F ðRjfa;bgÞ ¼ a, or SaðR 0ÞnSaðRjfa;bgÞ ¼ f jg, in which case we
again conclude that FðR 0Þ ¼ a by Lemma 2.
On the other hand, Fð ~RÞ ¼ b and a A Tð ~RÞ imply, by lemma 1, that
F ð ~Rjfa;bgÞ ¼ b. Note that R 0 is defined on fa; bg and by the construction of
~R, it is clear that R 0 ¼ ~Rjfa;bg. But this means that FðR 0Þ ¼ b, yielding the
desired contradiction. Therefore, Fð ~RÞ ¼ a. r
Now we wish to pursue the monotonicity notion inherent to the preceding
result further. Since we deal with tops-only SCFs here, any change in a profile
which leaves the top-ranked alternatives unchanged will not have any impact
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upon the alternative chosen. Thus, an improvement of the relative position
of an alternative in a profile should be deemed as possibly new agents joining
the set of those who top rank that alternative. This line of reasoning leads us
to the following definition of top-monotonicity. We say that an SCF is top-
monotonic if and only if, for any m A N and R;R 0 A LðImÞN one has
F ðR 0Þ ¼ a whenever F ðRÞ ¼ a and SaðRÞHSaðR 0Þ. It will now be shown
that a unanimous Y-self-selective neutral tops-only SCF is top-monotonic.
Proposition 4. If F A Y is unanimous and Y-self-selective, then it is top-
monotonic.
Proof. Assume that F A Y is a unanimous Y-self-selective SCF. Pick
R; ~R A LðImÞN , where m A N, and assume that FðRÞ ¼ a and SaðRÞHSað ~RÞ.
Let R ¼ ðRSað ~RÞ; ~RNnSað ~RÞÞ, i.e., R is the preference profile where the agents
in Sað ~RÞ are endowed with their preference orderings in R, while the remain-
ing agents in NnSað ~RÞ are assigned their preference orderings in ~R. But then
SaðRÞ ¼ SaðRÞ. We will first show that F ðRÞ ¼ a.
Set V ¼ fi A N j tðRiÞ0 tðRiÞg. If V ¼q, then clearly F ðRÞ ¼ a, since F
is tops-only. Now consider the case where V 0q, and take any j A V with
tðRjÞ ¼ b0 c ¼ tðRjÞ, and a0 b, a0 c. For all k A NnSaðRÞ with cRkaRkb,
let R̂k ¼ Rs1k where s1ðaÞ ¼ b, s1ðbÞ ¼ a and s1ðxÞ ¼ x for all x A Imnfa; bg.
For any k A NnSaðRÞ with bRkaRkc, on the other hand, let s2ðaÞ ¼ c,
s2ðcÞ ¼ a, and s2ðxÞ ¼ x for all x A Imnfa; cg, and set R̂k ¼ Rs2k . Finally, let
R̂k ¼ Rk for all the remaining agents in N. In other words, whenever b and c
are separated by a in Rk, we rearrange agent k’s preference in such a way that
now both b and c are preferred to a, while the restriction of the relevant linear
orderings to fb; cg remains same. Note that the tops do not change where one
passes from R to R̂, i.e., tðRiÞ ¼ tðR̂iÞ for all i A N. Thus, FðR̂Þ ¼ a ¼ FðRÞ.
Also, remembering that tðR̂jÞ ¼ tðRjÞ ¼ b and so b A TðR̂Þ, we conclude that
F ðR̂jfa;bgÞ ¼ a in view of lemma 1.
We now define R̂ 0 by letting R̂ 0i ¼ R̂i for all i A Nnf jg, whereas, for any
x; y A Imnfcg, we have cR̂ 0j x, and xR̂ 0j y i¤ xR̂jy. In other words, we obtain R̂ 0
from R̂ by making c the top-ranked alternative of agent j and leaving every-
thing else unchanged. Note that R̂jsfa;bg ¼ R̂ 0jfa; cg is a direct consequence of
the definitions of R̂ and R̂ 0, where s : fa; bg ! fa; cg is defined by sðaÞ ¼ a,
and sðbÞ ¼ c. Now since F is neutral and F ðR̂jfa;bgÞ ¼ a, we conclude that
F ðR̂ 0jfa; cgÞ ¼ a. Now this means that F ðR̂ 0Þ0 c according to Lemma 1. But
F ðR̂ 0Þ0 b either, for otherwise we would have F ðR̂Þ ¼ b0 a by proposi-
tion 3. Suppose that FðR̂ 0Þ ¼ d A TðR̂ 0Þnfag. Now clearly there is some
R̂ 00 A LðImÞN such that R̂ 00jfa;dg ¼ R̂jfa;dg and tðR̂ 00i Þ ¼ tðR̂ 0i Þ for all i A N.
But then FðR̂ 00Þ ¼ F ðR̂ 0Þ ¼ d, and thus FðR̂ 00jfa;dgÞ ¼ d by Lemma 1. By the
same lemma, however, we also have FðR̂jfa;dgÞ ¼ a, a contradiction. There-
fore, FðR̂ 0Þ ¼ a. In the above procedure, we started from R with FðRÞ ¼ a
and obtained R̂ 0 such that FðR̂ 0Þ ¼ a and tðRiÞ ¼ tðR̂ 0i Þ for all i A N H f jg.
Now if k A V nf jg, then we can find some ^̂R A LðImÞN by assigning the
role of R in the above procedure to R̂ 0 such that Fð ^̂RÞ ¼ a and tðR̂ 0i Þ ¼ tð
^̂
RiÞ
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for all i A Nnfkg and tð ^̂RkÞ ¼ tðRkÞ, i.e., tðRiÞ ¼ tð ^̂RiÞ for all i A Nnf j; kg,
but tð ^̂RjÞ ¼ tðRjÞ and tð ^̂RkÞ ¼ tðRkÞ. Applying this procedure successively
to each agent in V, we end up with some R 0 such that F ðR 0Þ ¼ a and
tðR 0i Þ ¼ tðRiÞ for all i A N, implying that FðRÞ ¼ a.
Finally, to show that F ð ~RÞ ¼ a, take i A Sað ~RÞnSaðRÞ, if any, and let
R 0t ¼ Rt for all t A Nnfig and R 0i be such that tðR 0i Þ ¼ a. But then FðR 0Þ ¼ a
by proposition 3. Applying this procedure successively to every agent
in Sað ~RÞnSaðRÞ, we end up with some ~~R A LðImÞN such that Fð ~~RÞ ¼ a
and tð ~~RtÞ ¼ tð ~RtÞ for all t A N. Therefore, Fð ~RÞ ¼ a, and hence F is top-
monotonic. r
We are now ready to prove that neutral, unanimous and Y-self-selective
SCFs satisfy IIA.
Proposition 5. If F A Y is unanimous and Y-self-selective, then F satisfies IIA.
Proof. Assume that F A Y is unanimous and Y-self-selective. Let m A N,
R A LðImÞN , and set FðRÞ ¼ a. Take BH Im with a B B, and set R 0 ¼ RjImnB.
Suppose that F ðR 0Þ ¼ b0 a. Note that b B TðRÞ in view of Lemma 1 and
a A TðR 0Þ. Clearly, Rjfa;bg ¼ R 0jfa;bg, which we will simply denote by R 00.
Since F ðR 0Þ ¼ b, we have F ðR 00Þ0 a again by lemma 1, so that FðR 00Þ ¼ b.
Now set K ¼ fi A NnSaðRÞ j aRibg and K 0 ¼ fi A NnSaðRÞ j bRiag. For each
i A K , j A K 0 let R̂i; R̂j A LðImÞ be such that Lða; R̂iÞ ¼ Lðb; R̂jÞ ¼ Im, and set
R̂k ¼ Rk for all k A SaðRÞ. Clearly, SaðRÞHSaðR̂Þ, implying that FðR̂Þ ¼ a
since F is top-monotonic by proposition 4 and F ðRÞ ¼ a. Moreover, the con-
struction of R̂ is such that R̂jfa;bg ¼ R 00 and tðR 00i Þ ¼ tðR̂iÞ for all i A N. But
then F ðR 00Þ ¼ F ðR̂Þ ¼ a by Proposition 2 and neutrality of F, contradicting
that F ðR 00Þ ¼ b. Hence, FðR 0Þ ¼ a, i.e., F satisfies IIA. r
There are three di¤erent ways two obtain the main result. The first one is a
corollary to Proposition 4 via Müller-Satterthwaite Theorem [5]. The second
one is a corollary to Proposition 5 through Koray [3] which itself utilizes
Arrow’s Theorem [1]. Unel [6] contains the third proof which does not utilize
any kind of impossibility theorems, and based on proposition 4 and 5. For the
sake of brevity, we will consider the first two ways. In both ways, as the said
theorems only apply to Im with m b 3, the case m ¼ 2 is treated separately.
Corollary 2. Let F A Y be a unanimous SCF. F is Y-self-selective if and only if
F is dictatorial.
Proof. The ‘‘if ’’ part is obvious. Conversely, if F is Y-self-selective, then F is
top-monotonic by proposition 4. Now, for each m A N, let Fm stand for the
restriction of F to LðImÞN . Note that Fm is monotonic for each m A N and
thus dictatorial by Müller-Satterthwaite Theorem [5] whenever m b 3. That is,
for each m A N, there is some im A N who is a dictator for Fm : LðImÞN ! Im.
We will now show that all the dictators im for m b 3 coincide and, moreover,
this common agent is also a dictator when m A f1; 2g.
First consider k; l A N with k > lb 3. Let R A LðIkÞN be such that,
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for any t A Ik1, tRik ðtþ 1Þ and ðtþ 1ÞRj t for all j A Nnfikg. Now FðRÞ ¼
FkðRÞ ¼ tðRik Þ ¼ 1, and, moreover, FðRjIlÞ ¼ 1 since F satisfies IIA by prop-
osition 5. But since tððRjIlÞjÞ ¼ l0 1 for each j A Nnfikg, this implies that
ik ¼ il.
To show that the same agent is also a dictator for F2, take any R A LðI2ÞN .
Define ~R A LðI3ÞN by letting, for any i A N and any x; y A I2, x ~Riy, xRiy,
and x ~Ri3. But then tðRiÞ ¼ tð ~RiÞ for any i A N, so that F ð ~RÞ ¼ FðRÞ by
Proposition 2. This, however, simply means that i3 is also a dictator for F2. As
the same agent is trivially a dictator for F1 as well, we conclude that F is dic-
tatorial. r
Another way of proving the above corollary is, as mentioned before, by
utilizing Theorem 1 in Koray [3] which states that a neutral unanimous SCF
is universally self-selective if and only if it is Paretian and satisfies IIA. The
conjunction of Corollary 1 and Proposition 5 here implies that a unanimous
Y-self-selective SCF F A Y is Paretian and satisfies IIA, and therefore F is
universally self-selective. It is known from Koray [3] again that neutral, unani-
mous, and universally self-selective SCFs are dictatorial, yielding yet another
proof for the above corollary.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we dealt with the question of characterizing self-selective SCFs
on the tops-only domain. We showed that, for a neutral, unanimous, and tops-
only SCF F, the restriction of rival SCFs used for testing the consistency of F
in the sense of self-selectivity to the class Y of neutral and tops-only SCFs
goes unnoticed. In other words, deleting neutral, unanimous SCFs which are
not tops-only from the set of potential rivals does not make the self-selectivity
test any easier for an SCF in Y, for again only dictatorial SCFs turn out to
pass this consistency test.
It might be illuminating to give an estimation about the relative sizes of the
class of unanimous and neutral SCFs and the class of unanimous, neutral and
tops-only SCFs. For the case where there are n agents and m alternatives, the
number of neutral and unanimous SCFs is computed as mðm
n11Þððm1Þ!Þ n1 in
[3]. For n ¼ 3 and m ¼ 4, this number is equal to 16270. On the other hand,
the number of tops-only and unanimous SCFs can be seen to equal mðm
nmÞ,
which is equal to 1630, for n ¼ 3 and m ¼ 4. The number of tops-only, unan-
imous and neutral SCFs is surely much smaller than this number. Note that,
the proportion of the number of unanimous, neutral and tops-only SCFs to the
number of unanimous and neutral SCFs is smaller than 116
 240
. Thus, even for
small values of m, the shrinkage in the size of the set of test functions obtained
by confining these to tops-only ones is huge. The deletion of an immense class
of SCFs from the test set goes unnoticed regarding self-selectivity.
One natural extension of this paper is to search for other sets of SCFs with
which one can escape the dictatoriality result. In a companion paper, Koray
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and Slinko [4] pursue the research in this line by considering various classes
of potential rival SCFs which play the same role as the particular class Y
of neutral and tops-only SCFs here. Starting with any neutral hereditary
social choice correspondence p, F is taken to be a p-complete collection
of SCFs in the sense that, for every linear order profile R and every a A pðRÞ,
F owns an SCF F with F ðRÞ ¼ a. Koray and Slinko [4] show that, in
the presence of at least three alternatives, an SCF F (not necessarily in F) is
F-self-selective if and only if F is p-dictatorial or p-antidictatorial. p-
dictatoriality (p-antidictatoriality) means that there exists some p-dictator
(p-antidictator) i in the sense that, for any preference profile R, one has
F ðRÞ ¼ arg maxpðRÞRi ðF ðRÞ ¼ arg minpðRÞRiÞ.
By restricting the domain of SCFs to single-peaked preference profiles
and modifying the relevant notions appropriately, Unel [6] finds a class of
nondictatorial self-selective SCFs. The characterization of the set of the non-
dictatorial SCFs on the single-peaked preference profiles is yet to be done.
As already mentioned in the introduction, if we allow the social choice
rules dealt with to be set-valued, the picture is expected to change quite radi-
cally. Although it is not known, thus yet to be found, what universally self-
selective SCRs exactly are, Koray [2] answers this question for voting rules
which are defined as nonempty-valued neutral top-majoritarian social choice
correspondences (SCC), where an SCC is called top-majoritarian if and only
if, at all linear order profiles with a strict majority of agents top-ranking one
and the same alternative, it chooses the singleton consisting of that alternative
only. In this context, Koray [2] rediscovers the Condorcet rule as the maximal
neutral top-majoritarian and self-selective social choice rule.
The notion of self-selectivity as a novel consistency criterion seems to
belong to a class of concepts which are appealing but di‰cult to achieve,
and thus lead to impossibility theorems. On the other hand, the question of
whether there exist any further well-established social-choice-theoretic con-
cepts other than the Condorcet rule which possess some version of this kind
of consistency as one of their major characteristics sounds interesting, and is
yet to be explored.
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